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ARTICLE 
INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PROBLEM  
WITH INCREMENTALISM 
SAUL LEVMORE† 
 Incrementalism, as opposed to dramatic change, is conventionally lauded 
in law as the prudent path of change—a path that gives credit to history and 
precedent.  The conventional view, however, pays little attention to interest 
groups.  Step-by-step change poses a serious problem when it rearranges the con-
stellation of supporters and opponents of further moves.  The core problem is 
that once an interest group loses and becomes subject to some regulation, it has 
reason to turn on its competitors and see to it that they also be regulated.  The 
laws that emerge on the incrementalist’s path therefore may not mark progress 
toward socially desirable or democratic outcomes.  Examples of incrementalist 
laws include environmental standards, smoking bans, disability accommoda-
tions, and minimum-age legislation.  Nearly all law, however, can be seen as 
incrementalist, just as most tradeoffs can be described as sliding on slippery 
slopes.  The incrementalism problem is most striking when a prior regulatory 
step is costly to reverse from the perspective of those who must comply.  The prob-
lem is alleviated when there is real learning from experience; it is exacerbated 
when advocates of change implement a divide-and-conquer strategy to separate 
defending interests.  Compensation policies or even moratoria on certain kinds 
of regulation could possibly decrease wasteful rent seeking and minimize the  
interest-group problem. 
 
 
† William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  I am 
grateful for suggestions received from Brian Hanessian, Faye Paul, Ariel Porat, Zak Ro-
senfield, Cass Sunstein, and, as always, colleagues at a faculty workshop at the Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to encourage lawmakers to be moderate, or incrementalist.  
The case for incrementalism—under which regulation can provide for 
experimental stopping points that do not necessarily portend further 
movement along a slippery slope—is built on claims about unin-
tended consequences, expectations, risk aversion, and learning by 
doing.  Meanwhile, any proposal for sweeping change can be derided 
as the product of impatience and an inadequate appreciation of histo-
ry and precedent.  Incrementalists favor leaps over baby steps only 
when systems are regarded as beyond repair or bad habits need to be 
broken with shoves rather than nudges.  The presence of multiple 
sources of law and interactive lawmaking may also encourage incre-
mentalism.  Since legislatures, courts, executive officers, administra-
tive agencies, and even voters interact, incremental lawmaking is often 
the strategy most respectful of each player’s role.  In this stew, each 
cook is told to fear that drastic action will spoil the broth. 
Leading commentators encourage incrementalism.1  Most of the 
encouragement is directed at judges, but the arguments used in favor 
 
1 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SU-
PREME COURT 4 (1999) (arguing that minimalism promotes deliberative democracy); 
Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 519-22 (2008) (con-
trasting the “optimal search” approach, which “recommends considerable innovation” 
in the hunt for a “successful” policy, with the Burkean approach, which “favors incre-
mental change that is regularly evaluated empirically”); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Mi-
nimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362-66 (2006) (describing judicial minimalism as con-
straining judges to shallow and narrow changes in law).  Most of the cases discussed in 
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of incrementalism are equally applicable to regulators and legislators.  
Incrementalism might also mean different things to different observ-
ers:  one person’s moderation is another’s drastic change, and every 
new law can be seen as a step toward far-reaching change.  For present 
purposes, however, a proposal is incrementalist if advocates of more 
drastic change will support the proposal both because they approve 
the change it represents and because it may be a step toward their 
larger goal.  It is, for example, incrementalist to propose a limitation 
on gun ownership or a smoking ban in limited areas with the aim of 
eventually prohibiting all firearms or smoking in all public places. 
The conventional view of incrementalism pays little attention to 
interest groups.2  There is a serious problem with piecemeal change, 
however, when it rearranges the constellation of supporters and op-
ponents of further moves and gives organized interest groups reason 
to realign themselves in response to the incremental change.  I begin 
with such matters as the prohibition of smoking in restaurants (while 
smoking remained legal in bars and hotels) and the requirement of 
ramps and other disability accommodations (initially in new buildings 
and then in some older structures).  One can almost freely substitute, 
however, the imposition of progressively more exacting fuel-economy 
standards on automobile manufacturers and the establishment of in-
centives to achieve targeted reductions in the production of heat-
trapping gases.3  Incrementalism is everywhere—though certainly not 
 
this Article deal with legislation and regulation, although some of the changes, such as 
disability accommodations, came about through judicial action. 
 The argument advanced here also applies to judicial decisions, for they, too, are 
influenced by interest groups—in litigation as well as in appointment and confirma-
tion.  The type of influence, however, is different.  Stare decisis also changes the argu-
ment as applied to courts:  legislatures are not bound by any such principle.  Finally, as 
is well known, various doctrines and conventions limit interest groups’ ability to con-
trol the order in which incremental (or drastic) change is proposed to courts.  See gen-
erally MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS:  A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000) (discussing the impact of doctrines such as 
standing and stare decisis on court decisions); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from 
the Forest:  Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) (arguing that the 
standing doctrine prevents opportunistic litigants from controlling the critically impor-
tant path of legal decisions).  For the most part, the incrementalism problem in judi-
cial decisionmaking is left for another day. 
2 For example, two recent discussions of incrementalism do not discuss the effects 
of interest groups.  See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Glob-
al Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 855 (2007); James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or 
One Fell Swoop?:  The Incremental Extension of Rights Is Not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2001). 
3 As we will see, the last example represents a serious incrementalism problem.  
Fuel-economy standards, however, do not, because they resemble minimum-age legis-
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everywhere alike.  There is little reason to be confident that the laws 
that emerge on the incrementalist’s path represent progress toward 
socially desirable or democratic outcomes—though I will make the 
realistic assumption in most of the examples here that we are uncer-
tain about the location of the social optimum.  Part I describes repre-
sentative cases and explores what I call the “incrementalism problem.”  
This problem is especially interesting when a prior regulatory step is 
irreversible from the perspective of those who must comply.  Part II 
suggests that a common defense of incrementalism—that policymak-
ers learn from experience and therefore from small, prior steps—is 
rather weak.  The discussion extends the scope of the incrementalism 
problem to minimum-age legislation and to the larger topic of slip-
pery (and nonslippery) slopes.  Part III explores the idea of using 
compensation to solve the incrementalism problem.  Compensation 
could push interest groups to form coalitions that can optimally de-
fend against the divide-and-conquer strategy that is at the core of the 
incrementalism problem.  This is an offshoot of the claim that, in a 
world with overachieving interest groups, we need organized groups 
to oppose one another in order to obtain desirable results.4  This coa-
lition-formation, or power-politics, approach to incrementalism, how-
ever, proves difficult to implement.  One problem is specifying the 
conditions that trigger compensation; virtually every proposed law can 
be framed as embedded in a larger picture such that every law be-
comes a sly incrementalist move.  Another problem becomes apparent 
when the focus shifts from power politics to rent seeking (i.e., re-
source-consuming activity undertaken to gain a profit or government-
sponsored advantage).  The possibility of obtaining compensation is 
likely to increase wasteful rent seeking by those who gain from in-
fluencing lawmakers.  The problems with most things compensatory 
suggest a solution, sketched in Part IV, that begins with upfront dis-
closure of regulatory aims and then provides for a moratorium on 
 
lation and other regulation that does not divide and conquer different groups.  See infra 
Section III.C. 
4 One commentator describes this claim: 
Many years ago, James Buchanan suggested a solution:  The U.S. could select—
perhaps at random—some other group of people about the same size as the bene-
fitted group and could put the tax on them.  Thus, two lobbying groups would be 
opposing each other and the outcome presumably would be improved. 
Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking and Tax Reform, CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES, Oct. 1988, at 37, 
46.  On assessing the power of interest groups and the magnitude of rent-seeking be-
havior, see Paul J. Stancil, Assessing Interest Groups:  A Playing Field Approach, 29 CARDO-
ZO L. REV. 1273 (2008). 
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regulation beyond a specified limit.  Again, the problem is more ap-
parent than the solution.  A brief conclusion follows and suggests that 
incrementalism in lawmaking should be feared as often as it is wel-
comed.  As the discussion works toward this conclusion, it has two aims, 
one positive and one normative.  The positive aim is to develop a tool of 
analysis; the incrementalism problem and its possible solutions can help 
us to understand the path of lawmaking and the role of interest groups 
in forging that path.  The normative aim is to argue against those who 
believe in moderation in all, or most, things.  My claim is that this view 
of optimal change ignores the presence of interest groups. 
I.  INCREMENTALISM AND IRREVERSIBILITY 
A.  The Incrementalism Problem 
Consider a case in which the American Association of People with 
Disabilities, or perhaps an advocate for disabled veterans, seeks to im-
pose new building requirements in a jurisdiction that previously re-
quired accessibility only in new construction.  The proposal mandates 
wheelchair-accommodating ramps in all commercial buildings, which 
would require substantial retrofitting.5  Owners of these buildings are 
 
5 The actual progression of the law has been complex.  Congress first passed the 
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, which requires accommodations for people with 
disabilities in all new federally funded construction.  Pub. L. No. 90-480, 82 Stat. 718 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151–4156 (2006)).  A variety of other regula-
tions culminated in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which requires “rea-
sonable accommodation” of the disabled in all places of employment with fifteen or 
more employees and in all places of public accommodation.  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12201, 12203–12213 (2006) 
(amended 2008); 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2006)).  The latter category is a broad one 
that includes most places in which commercial activity is undertaken.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12181(7) (2006) (defining “public accommodation” to include, among other things, 
hotels, theaters, bakeries, and laundromats).  The courts largely determine what ac-
commodation is reasonable. 
 Architectural requirements for new construction are remarkably detailed.  See U.S. 
ARCHITECTURAL & TRANSP. BARRIERS COMPLIANCE BD., AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT (ADA) ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES (2002), available at 
http://www.access-board.gov/adaag/html/adaag.htm (detailing complex requirements 
for ramps, stairs, elevators, drinking fountains, and many other features of new struc-
tures).  For a detailed discussion of the evolution of these regulations, see Jonathan C. 
Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:  Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation 
and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1376-1405 (1993). 
 The Fair Housing Act (FHA) regulates residential buildings.  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–
3619 (2006).  In 1988, the FHA was amended to include people with disabilities.  Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006)).  Under the FHA, landlords must 
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opposed, if only because compliance will be costly.  These owners did 
not choose to install ramps before the law required them to do so, 
even though it might have helped them generate more revenue since 
most other buildings remained inaccessible.  They will argue that dis-
abled persons can work and shop in other buildings where ramps have 
been voluntarily constructed or where ramps have been required by 
law in new construction.  These vulnerable property owners would like 
to gain political support from other groups, including their tenants, 
owners of multifamily residential buildings, small shop owners whose 
structures are likely excluded from the “commercial buildings” cate-
gory, and perhaps even owners of single-family homes.  But even the 
most sophisticated members of these groups are unsure whether to 
devote resources to opposing or supporting the proposal.  From the 
perspective of shop owners, for example, the proposal will increase 
their competitors’ costs, much as the previous legislation benefited 
many of them indirectly by raising the costs of new construction.  So-
phisticated owners recognize that advocates or lawmakers who cham-
pion the cause of mandated accommodations will likely advance their 
agenda step-by-step.  Store owners and even homeowners might won-
der whether lawmakers will eventually require them to modify their 
properties at significant cost and with a very small prospect of offset-
ting revenues. 
In the most straightforward version of what I will call the “incre-
mentalism problem,” the accommodation advocates consider only the 
benefits—not the costs—of accommodations and aim to push the law 
as far as they can.  Perhaps they favor government-mandated access 
 
allow disabled tenants to make adjustments to unit and common spaces.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(f)(3)(A).  In addition, all new residential buildings with four or more units 
must be made handicapped-accessible.  Id. § 3604(f)(3)(C). 
 The example in the text may also be understood as concerning local law, which 
often precedes or adds to federal law.  California, for example, enacted broad disability 
legislation in 1980, and this regime has been updated frequently and incrementally.  
See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, ch. 992, 1988 Cal. Stat. 3138 (codi-
fied as amended at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–12996 (West 2009)).  For an overview 
of the California enactment, see generally Michael L. Murphy, John H. Fanning Labor 
Law Writing Competition Winner, Assembly Bill 2222:  California Pushes and Breaks the 
Disability Law Envelope, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 495 (2002).  The example in the text is in-
tentionally ambiguous as to whether the requirement will attach to all older buildings 
or only to those that have been renovated or otherwise modified.  The ambiguity re-
flects the pattern of existing law, in which the rules for new construction apply to the 
modification of older buildings, whereas the owners of untouched older buildings 
must simply remove architectural barriers that can readily be eliminated.  It also sug-
gests, however, that courts or agencies can choose to be more or less aggressive in dec-
laring which buildings must be modified.  
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ramps wherever there are stairs and no lifts.  Of course, doors could 
be widened and products on shelves made more accessible.  These ad-
vocates, as I will call those who wish to alter the status quo, perceive 
that if these aspirations were packaged into a law and proposed in one 
fell swoop—in dramatic rather than incremental fashion—then they 
would be defeated.  The loss would occur because of the combined 
resistance of owners, especially those who could be easily organized in 
order to overcome the familiar collective action problem, joined per-
haps by tenants and retailers.6  If the advocates begin with large com-
mercial buildings, where the cost-benefit calculus is likely to be most 
compelling, because ramps involve fixed costs and more users suggest 
greater benefit, then the opposition might be dispersed, modest in 
number, and unlikely to generate sympathy.  If successful here, the 
advocates can turn their attention and political resources to other 
structures, stores, or residential buildings.7  In this next step, the 
property owners directly affected by the previous step will have no rea-
son to oppose the extension of the law.  In fact, they will likely favor 
the next incremental move because it levels the playing field.8  A ramp 
 
6 The question why new construction has been regulated more readily than old 
buildings or retailers remains.  A few explanations can be offered.  It is normally less 
expensive to build ramps when starting anew than it is to retrofit, so a cost-benefit 
analysis might have caused lawmakers to favor regulating new construction either as a 
start or simply to earn the highest social rate of return for a given investment.  New 
construction costs also fall largely on dispersed and unidentifiable future owners of 
properties, who may simply be less able to stand up to the advocates for improved 
access.  In any event, the owners of newly constructed and regulated buildings have no 
great reason to favor (or disfavor) the regulation of preexisting structures unless they 
think that some of these will close down and rents will rise elsewhere. 
7 The tale in the text depicts a strategic advocacy group, but the incrementalism 
problem does not depend on conscious, strategic behavior.  Advocates may innocently 
push for an incremental change because they perceive that the smaller change is all 
that can be obtained at present.  They may be unaware of the alignment of interest 
groups opposed to the changes they support.  It is nevertheless a problem if this hap-
pens repeatedly, as if there were strategic division of the defense, and in a manner that 
takes us away from the social optimum. 
8 Competition is probably the key to recognition.  In 2009, for example, United 
Parcel Service (UPS) supported legislation that would put employees of FedEx, its di-
rect competitor, under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act; it had pre-
viously operated under the Railway Labor Act.  See Alex Roth, FedEx and UPS Clash over 
Legislation, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B1 (noting that regulation under the National 
Labor Relations Act would make it easier for FedEx employees to unionize); Press Re-
lease, FedEx, Railway Labor Act, available at http://ir.fedex.com/releasedetail.cfm? 
ReleaseID=388559 (“FedEx Express has been correctly covered by the [Railway Labor 
Act] since our first day of operation in 1973.”).  An important difference between the 
regulatory structures is that workers can unionize on a location-by-location basis under 
the former but not the latter.  We can think of the reaches of the Railway Labor Act 
and of the National Labor Relations Act as having been incrementally altered. 
LEVMORE_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  7:47 AM 
822 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 815 
requirement will not raise the marginal cost of products in stores, but 
it might push some stores out of business and raise rents in already 
regulated commercial buildings.  The incrementalism problem is that 
a legal intervention might be both socially inefficient and democrati-
cally disfavored yet come about because advocates can nudge the law 
to that end step-by-step, taking advantage of uncoordinated oppo-
nents.  The advocates might do this without any grand design, but the 
problem is more obvious when there is a strategy.  An early target of 
regulation may not plan or be expected to turn against its competitors, 
but it will not labor to protect its competitors from regulation. 
We might think of the incrementalism problem as one of several 
ways in which the output of a political or judicial process appears pa-
radoxical.  There are intransitivities that cannot be solved; a number 
of voting paradoxes drive home the point that when we aggregate pre-
ferences, we often get results that seem illogical but are in fact nearly 
inevitable.9  Then there are slippery slopes, such that the final resting 
point of a law is something unwanted when the polity started down 
the slope.  Transaction costs, self-interest, and a variety of other fac-
tors can make this so.  The guiding principle in each of these sources 
of unease is that law can be path dependent in a way that is troubling 
even to citizens who do not have idealistic expectations of the law.10 
This somewhat stylized tale of mandated investments, which may 
or may not be socially efficient, involves strategic behavior by advo-
 
9 Many well-known voting paradoxes arise out of preferences that cannot be ag-
gregated in a way guaranteed to be consistent and to meet other seemingly simple re-
quirements of democratic decisionmaking.  See William H. Riker & Steven J. Brams, 
The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1235, 1241 (1973) (analyzing the  
logrolling paradox and concluding that “if each [legislator] behaves rationally by mak-
ing the trades possible for him, all the members suffer.  They are, in fact, worse off than 
if they had voted sincerely or naively.”).  The problem may be compounded in the 
presence of overachieving interest groups.  See generally Saul Levmore, Voting Paradoxes 
and Interest Groups, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1999) (discussing the basic voting paradox 
as well as logrolling and other voting paradoxes and introducing the idea that interest 
groups exploit paradoxes).  These paradoxes are also present in the judicial context.  
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 823-31 
(1982) (examining the decisionmaking processes of the Supreme Court from a public-
choice perspective and concluding that inconsistency is inevitable in such an institution). 
10 In describing the mechanisms of the slippery slope, Eugene Volokh describes 
how mandatory gun registration could lead to gun confiscation even though confisca-
tion could not have garnered sufficient support at the initial stage.  See Eugene Volokh, 
The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1033 (2003) (“Registration 
may change people’s attitudes about the propriety of confiscation, by making them 
view gun possession not as a right but as a privilege that the government grants and 
therefore may deny.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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cates but little foresight on the part of those who would be regulated.  
In the accommodations example, it is easy to see the incrementalism 
problem from the perspective of the owners of significant commercial 
properties, but, of course, that is not the same as asserting that there is 
a serious social problem.  That conclusion, as well as the quest for solu-
tions to it, normally requires that the optimal regulation be identified.   
Here, as elsewhere, identification of the optimal regulation is un-
likely both because some of the costs are nonpecuniary and because 
extensive experimentation and data gathering would be required in 
order to assess the benefits of accommodations in selected locations, 
the effects of subsidies for accommodations, the share of benefits that 
might be obtained with modifications only to buildings located near 
accessible public transportation, and so forth.  The same will be true 
for other instances of incremental lawmaking by legislatures, courts, 
and agencies.  Indeed, one question to address is whether this incre-
mentalism problem has any bounds at all.  For the present, I address 
only the questions of the social optimum and of boundaries.  I suggest 
that we first get a sense of the problem of incrementalism and then 
see whether it can be solved in a way that minimizes the risk of creat-
ing a social problem when none previously existed. 
The incrementalism problem may also take the form of producing 
the “wrong” regulation rather than too much regulation.  If A wants to 
gain Z by regulating W, then regulating X, then Y, and finally Z, and 
the social optimum is likely to be W, A may look to start with the 
group that not only can be divided and conquered but also will be 
most effective if it joins A and turns on a competitor in the second 
step.  A may have the political power to take any one step, and it may, 
for example, bring about the regulation of X, knowing that X will then 
turn on Y using X’s own political power.  Power politics may be such 
that W, X, and Y end up being regulated in that order, when in fact 
either W alone, or perhaps W and then X only, should have been re-
gulated.  In most of what follows, examples are constructed to em-
phasize the problem of too much regulation.  It should be unders-
tood, however, that there may instead, or also, be a danger of the 
wrong regulation.  For example, smoking bans may have been im-
posed on restaurants before bars not because there is more second-
hand smoke in restaurants or because a cost-benefit calculus sug-
gested that the restaurant ban was the superior “investment.”  Rather, 
smoking bans may have been imposed because advocates perceived 
that restaurant owners, once regulated, would be better at overcoming 
their collective action problem—in order to bring about the regula-
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tion of bars—than would bar owners.  Once regulated, each group 
would likely favor the extension of the ban to the other inasmuch as 
they are rivals for patrons.  If advocates’ perceptions are incorrect, this 
incrementalism may cause the regulation to end with restaurants even 
if the social optimum includes the regulation of bars. 
Returning to the specific case of access ramps, it is plausible that 
the cost of retrofitting buildings makes the optimum policy one of re-
quiring ramps only for large buildings, where this cost is spread over 
many users.  In the absence of legal intervention, the market might 
arrive at something close to this conclusion on its own and might im-
prove on legal intervention by settling on ramps in some but not all 
locations of each type.11  In any event, let us posit that existing single-
family homes and small shops will definitely escape regulation because 
lawmakers uniformly perceive such regulation to be socially ineffi-
cient, because advocates choose to expend their political capital on 
higher-valued ends, or because the owners of these homes and shops, 
however dispersed, have enough political power to defend against the 
considerable costs that would be imposed.  Still, it is clear that ineffi-
cient law might result from the divide-and-conquer strategy.  Store 
owners, for example, are not well organized and do not know whether 
to join with the owners of larger commercial properties in opposing 
regulation that is drafted to apply only to the latter group.  It might be 
that they free ride on the defense mounted by the larger property 
owners; it may be that they are simply too dispersed to organize in op-
position; and it may be that they miscalculate how far legislation will 
go, though this last mistake has little to do with incrementalism. 
If a single party owned all of the structures in a jurisdiction, there 
would be no incrementalism problem, or at least not one of the kind 
defined here.  Based on the details first (or subsequently and incremen-
tally) proposed, a property owner might miscalculate the investment it 
should make in opposing legal intervention.  There might, in this sense, 
be an incrementalism issue, but one not different from that faced by 
participants in markets and politics everywhere, who must assess the in-
tensity of preferences and the strategic behavior of other parties. 
 
11 Market solutions normally involve change over time, so we do not expect all prop-
erty owners who install ramps to do so at the same time.  The owners may have different 
costs, discount rates, and so forth.  A legal mandate generally requires compliance in a 
specified time period; sometimes the effective date is in the future, and even then differ-
ent owners can comply at different times.  Effective dates and grandfather clauses are 
other sources of incrementalism and subjects of interest-group activity. 
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For example, if A seeks to return a product purchased from B, or 
sues B because the product was found injurious, B needs to decide on 
its response without knowing whether A or another buyer will subse-
quently seek to return other products or bring suit regarding other 
injuries.  B may underinvest or overinvest, but we normally expect B to 
bargain with A, and we use the law of fraud to constrain the responses 
the parties give one another when asked specific questions.  Somewhat 
similarly, when X and Y contract, X may get better terms by implying 
that, over time, it will order more of Y’s goods if satisfied; in response, 
Y may lower its price or overinvest in servicing the account.  However, 
Y can protect itself in the contracting process.  Y can stipulate that the 
price of each item shipped to X will be q dollars but that there will be 
a discount to p dollars if X orders more than one thousand items with-
in the calendar year.  If this creates too great a risk that Y will lower 
quality, X can contract for extra payments in the event of defective 
products and so forth.  The incrementalism problem can in this way 
be seen as a problem of incomplete information; X and Y can over-
come this problem, to a degree, with more bargaining. 
The property owners who fear governmental regulation are less 
able to solve their problem in this way because they have much higher 
transaction costs.  They may need to bargain with legislators and with 
a variety of interest groups.  Moreover, bargains with governments are 
not so easily made or enforced.  It is difficult for the government to 
“precommit” regarding future law,12 and markets for hedging the risk 
of future law are undeveloped.  But the easiest way to think about the 
singular character of the incrementalism problem may be to recog-
nize that when commercial parties, like X and Y, face incomplete in-
formation about subsequent transactions, they operate within the dis-
cipline of a competitive market.  X can make contractual demands on 
Y regarding future business because X can otherwise find another 
supplier who will guarantee future prices or quality.   
The government, however, faces little market pressure.  When 
it—or the interest groups or temporary legislatures that comprise 
“it”—misleads property owners about future regulation, there is 
normally no recourse.  If the government were a benevolent mono-
polist, there would be no incrementalism problem because the gov-
ernment would have no reason to hide its regulatory intentions or 
 
12 See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 618-22 (1996) (not-
ing that, absent internal congressional regulations to facilitate precommitments, the 
judiciary is unlikely to enforce serious restrictions on legislative second thoughts be-
cause of their undemocratic nature). 
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cost-benefit analyses.13  It is when the government is an intermediary 
of sorts, motivated by competing interest groups, that the incremen-
talism problem becomes a threat as a result of the coordination problem 
among groups. 
It bears repeating that a coordination issue is not necessarily a so-
cial problem.  If the advocates, rather than the defender-owners, have 
serious organization costs, then it may be a good thing if they can di-
vide and conquer the property owners, as that might help the process 
of power politics find its way to the social optimum.14  Indeed, many of 
the examples advanced here can be shaped so as to depict the advo-
cates of change as the players with the collective action problem, who 
might be divided and conquered or stymied.  It is only by choosing 
examples in which the advocates have a unitary goal, whereas the de-
fenders must not only coordinate politically but also be prepared to 
suffer significant compliance costs in the event of regulation, that the 
incrementalism problem is made to appear on one side alone.15  Re-
 
13 There is the question how a monopolist would impose or price access ramps in 
a market where subsequent “customers” valued the ramps at decreasing amounts.  I do 
not pursue this analogy here because my emphasis is on interest groups. 
14 This is one application of the analysis in an article by Eric Posner, Kathryn 
Spier, and Adrian Vermeule.  See Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule, 
Divide and Conquer 38-39 (Univ. of Chi., Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 467, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1414319 (asserting that the divide-and-
conquer strategy is ubiquitous, that it is normatively hard to assess unless we know the 
social optimum, and that a fairly common “solution” is to impose a kind of equal-
treatment rule, the success of which will depend on context).  Note that the equal-
treatment rule suggested by Posner, Spier, and Vermeule is unworkable in our regula-
tory setting because of the difficulty in identifying when situations are alike.  Moreover, 
there is presumably some optimum that contradicts the value of equal treatment.  It 
cannot possibly be that ramps should be everywhere. 
15 The focus on advocates rather than defenders might also be justified with the 
observation that the advocates set the agenda; they are on the attack and it is easier to 
think of them as dividing and conquering the defenders than the other way around. 
 It should be noted that the incrementalism exercise undertaken here introduces a 
kind of status-quo bias because I do not pause to ask how we came to the prevailing 
smoking, accommodation, or other policy that advocates now try to undo or outdo.  
But it is difficult to start in any other place, and the takings literature, which is some-
thing of a foil below, does much the same.  There, too, we can ask whether existing 
property rights are fair or even efficient before we endeavor to restrain inefficient tak-
ings.  See Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
181, 183-89 (2003) (hypothesizing that property rights, both real and intellectual, may 
plausibly evolve as the result of wealth-maximizing allocations or interest-group pres-
sures; regulatory law normally assumes the former and might add to the inefficiency 
when the latter is instead true); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property 
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S423-33 (2002) (arguing that every instance of privati-
zation may have transaction-cost and interest-group explanations; without a great deal 
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gardless of whether the collective action problem is as great for advo-
cates as it is for defenders, it may be useful to think of incrementalism 
as a problem of nondisclosure, or even as a kind of fraud, since we 
normally think that full information is a good idea.  For example, if 
the initial access proposal made it seem as though ramps would not be 
required in stores and homes, then it would be troubling to learn that 
advocates had moved step-by-step to include all buildings, especially if 
they had induced the earlier losers to their side in the later steps of 
the political game.  I will continue to refer to incrementalism as prob-
lematic, though troubling is sometimes a better word.  An important 
but modest version of the argument advanced here is that we ought 
not celebrate incrementalism because it will normally be difficult to 
know whether incremental changes in law, and especially in legislated 
law, are desirable.16 
B.  Irreversibility 
Not all instances of incrementalism are alike.  The prospect of 
smoking bans—imposed by government order rather than by entre-
preneurial decision—in aircraft, restaurants, hotels, offices, shops, 
and bars presents a different story from that of access ramps.  It is 
tempting to see the same problem, or at least likelihood, of advocates 
going far past the social optimum as they take on one set of interests 
after another—defeating them one at a time when they could not 
have defeated them all at once.  But one difference between the cases 
is that ramps represent a kind of irreversible, sunk cost, whereas smok-
ing bans can be reversed.17  In theory, if advocates move on to bars af-
 
of evidence to determine the actual origin, further government interventions that dis-
turb the status quo are hard to evaluate). 
16 A note of caution in the other direction is also appropriate.  Incrementalism 
may produce the wrong results even when there is no collective action problem among 
interest groups.  Defenders may underinvest if they think that each regulatory step is 
minor and not worth opposing with sufficient force.  But this is a problem with all bar-
gains, as discussed in the text.  There is also the danger that disparate interest groups 
care about proposed regulations to different degrees, so that it will be difficult to allo-
cate costs, and the danger of free riding will therefore be greater.  I do not emphasize 
this sort of collective action problem here because there is no reason to think this 
problem greater for advocates or defenders and no reason to think it is more of a 
problem with respect to incrementalist proposals than to more drastic ones. 
17 Once the ramps are built, the regulated party has no interest in reversing the 
ban because there is no marginal cost to further compliance.  In contrast, a smoking 
ban presumably imposes continuing costs on the entrepreneur who objects to it.  See, 
e.g., Nicholas A. Danella, Note, Smoked Out:  Bars, Restaurants, and Restrictive Antismoking 
Laws as Regulatory Takings, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1095, 1112-13 (2006) (reporting 
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ter establishing a ban on smoking in restaurants, bar owners and res-
taurateurs could join forces not only to block the proposed ban in 
bars but also to roll back the restriction on restaurants.  In the case of 
access ramps, the requirement attached to commercial buildings 
might have been similarly reversed as part of a package once other in-
terests formed a political coalition.  However, the owners of commer-
cial buildings will have already invested in compliance; it is not as if 
they can disassemble the ramps and sell them at cost.  In fact, regula-
tions of that kind are rarely reversed (in the absence of technological 
change), because there is very little political pressure to do so; there is 
little pressure, because there is little benefit to those who have in-
vested in an irreversible fashion.  It is thus probable that the incre-
mentalism problem is relatively serious in the case of disability ac-
commodations because the divide-and-conquer strategy is likely to be 
successful given the irreversibility feature.  Once a group loses, it has 
no incentive to join the defense when the next group is attacked, and 
it may even have reason to support the attack. 
This interesting difference between cases in which compliance 
costs are essentially upfront, nonrefundable investments and cases in 
which there are ongoing costs is less impressive if there is an endow-
ment effect with respect to regulation.  For instance, once smoking is 
banned, parties and expectations adjust so that there is much less 
pressure to reverse a law than to prevent its enactment in the first 
place.  Still, it is doubtful that such an endowment effect can ever be 
as powerful as the fact of irreversibility; thus, the problem of incre-
mentalism remains more remarkable when compliance with an earlier 
step in the regulatory process is irreversible.  The incrementalism 
problem is itself reinforced by the endowment effect such that laws, 
once on the books, are not easily removed. 
 
sales declines of thirty percent or more in bars subject to smoking bans).  But see Lainie 
Rutkow et al., Banning Second-Hand Smoke in Indoor Public Places Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act:  A Legal and Public Health Imperative, 40 CONN. L. REV. 409, 442 (2007) 
(“[P]eer-reviewed evaluations of the economic impact of smoking bans have definitively 
refuted this claim. . . . [I]f anything, many restaurants and bars experience neutral or 
positive economic effects after smoking bans are implemented.” (footnote omitted)). 
 Many other differences exist that do not advance the present argument.  Thus, 
there is a case to be made against smoking bans on the ground that consumers can 
simply avoid establishments that permit smoking such that some sorting will provide 
places that do and do not permit smoking.  It is possible that it is more difficult for 
owners of buildings to capture a portion of the benefits created by access ramps.  And 
it is certainly puzzling to observe overwhelming political success and yet so little market 
success in the preceding period.  All this can be disputed and is, in any event, not ne-
cessary to the point advanced in the text.  
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The problem is not as simple as sketched to this point.  There is 
no reason to think that most owners targeted in the first step of ramp 
requirements will overlook the fact that the accommodations about to 
be required are costly and irreversible.  If these owners think that po-
litical battle will help their cause, they will seek allies among other in-
terest groups, and they will try to impress upon these potential allies 
that the advocates for access will surely turn next to requiring further 
accommodations.  The irreversible character of the proposed ramps 
(or elevators, or any other required improvement) is neither secret 
nor subtle.  It ought to affect the likelihood that disparate interest 
groups will form a coalition to battle against an early regulatory step. 
In contrast, when the owners of restaurants try to convince the 
owners of bars to join them in fighting the proposed ban on smoking, 
both groups know that, if they fail to form an alliance at the first step, 
there will be opportunity to form one later on, if the second step of 
lawmaking develops.  If we compare the targets of the first steps in the 
two regulatory arenas, we see that those who must add accessibility 
ramps are in some sense worse off than the restaurateurs subject to a 
smoking ban, because the former’s compliance involves an upfront 
cost and is irreversible.  On the other hand, the fact that the restaura-
teurs’ compliance is a matter of reversible, ongoing behavior makes it 
more difficult for them to acquire allies for a defense at the first step.  
The incrementalism problem is in this way somewhat smaller than 
might first appear, because, as the problem looms larger, disparate in-
terests will be more inclined to form coalitions at earlier stages. 
It is, however, implausible that this homeostatic device is so re-
markable as to match the problem itself.  Owners face transaction 
costs and a variety of collective action problems that make the divide-
and-conquer metaphor seem appropriate.  A large invading army, A, 
surely prefers to face two unrelated opponents, B and C, rather than 
one large opponent, D, that is as powerful as B and C perfectly com-
bined.  There will be many cases in which A can battle B and then 
turn its full might on C, often with assistance from the remnants of B, 
much as the commercial property owners might eventually favor the 
law’s extension to other properties.  At best, B and C will sometimes 
form a defensive alliance, but that makes A no worse off than it would 
have been with D as an opponent. 
C.  Reversibility by Compensation 
No regulation is entirely irreversible, because subsequent law can 
require retroactive compensation to one who paid to fulfill an un-
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funded mandate.  I call this retroactive compensation, though that 
expression seems unnecessarily duplicative, to distinguish it from 
compensation that is promised in advance.  One who has property 
taken by the government is compensated;18 one who incurs costs by 
way of regulation might be retroactively compensated, in whole or in 
part, either because the government might choose to pay or because a 
legal regime might provide compensation for the loss incurred at step 
one if and only if some other legal step is taken at step two.  Compen-
sation for government takings does not normally depend on results in 
subsequent legal steps.  Thus, our commercial property owners might 
eventually join a coalition opposed to requiring ramps in all residen-
tial buildings, if that coalition agrees that it will press for a bill requir-
ing retrofitting only when the government is willing to pay the costs of 
modification—with a requirement that the government pay the costs for 
accommodations mandated and retrofitted during the past several years. 
This kind of legislative bundling appears to negate the role assigned 
to irreversibility.  It does not undo the social loss from building ramps 
that would not have survived cost-benefit analysis, but it is the private 
cost rather than the social loss that affects owners’ willingness to join in 
the political power struggle.  The prospect of retroactive compensation 
might cause a previous loser to join a defensive coalition.  If so, the 
smoking-ban and access-ramp cases are close relatives.  It is immediately 
apparent that compensation must play an important role in further dis-
cussion of the incrementalism problem and in power politics (i.e., the 
notion of pitting organized interests against one another).19 
Reversibility by compensation seems like a promising means of 
eliminating or at least reducing the incrementalism problem.  It 
avoids the larger question of why we do not require that all burden-
some regulations provide compensation.20  Virtually all legal systems 
provide for something like fair market value compensation for the 
complete taking of private property for public use,21 but no legal sys-
tem constitutionalizes or legislates compensation for the burdens ac-
 
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 57 (1985) (arguing that compensation should be paid if “the government re-
move[s] any of the incidents of ownership [or] diminish[es] the rights of the owner in any 
fashion . . . no matter how small the alteration and no matter how general its application”). 
21 See, e.g., DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:  TAKINGS 169 (2002) 
(“The basic legal standard for determining what constitutes just compensation is well 
established:  the owner is entitled to the fair market value of the property taken . . . .”). 
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companying mundane regulations, even when they fall on a narrow 
set of people or entities.  Compensable regulatory takings are rare be-
cause of valuation difficulties, because it is too difficult to tax or oth-
erwise to raise money from those who benefit from regulation, and 
because it is too difficult to establish a baseline from which such tak-
ings are measured.22  Still, it is worth noting that if all regulatory bur-
dens were compensated—or at least those that were not means of 
combating criminality, negligence, or nuisance—there would not be 
an incrementalism problem because there would be no reason for a 
property owner to object to socially efficient regulations.23  Although 
reversibility by compensation can be seen as a selective application of 
a broader takings law, its purpose is very different from that normally 
found in the takings literature.  There, the idea is to protect invest-
ments in private property,24 to encourage only efficient government 
interventions,25 to diminish incentives to engage in political activity at 
the expense of dispersed interests or single owners,26 and perhaps to 
provide insurance to losers.27  In this Article, however, the notion is to 
prevent and to reverse inefficient regulation by giving those who were 
once burdened reason to join coalitions that might block further, pre-
sumably inefficient, regulation.  This is, of course, an optimistic view.  
 
22 See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings:  An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 610-15 (1984) (arguing that the judicial ap-
proach to regulatory takings is unsatisfactory, and proposing an approach based purely 
on maximizing economic efficiency in which the government can be said to supply 
otherwise unavailable insurance through ex post compensation); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 111 (2002) (“When one 
examines American compensation law, however, one finds that . . . there is little guid-
ance about how to measure just compensation in regulatory takings cases.”); Jeremy 
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1438 & n.110, 1441 
(1991) (stressing the need to identify a “neutral baseline” in takings cases so that 
courts may evaluate regulation “against a reference point that is not provided by the 
regulators themselves . . . [nor] upon a method for evaluating regulatory goals that is 
more than merely the courts’ own judgment concerning the wisdom of the regulation”). 
23 Incrementalism could still be a problem because voters, now burdened not only 
by inefficient regulations but also by the financial responsibility of compensation, 
might pay more attention to drastic changes than to small ones.  Advocates might thus 
slide things past voters by proceeding incrementally.  This, however, would be a differ-
ent kind of incrementalism problem. 
24 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 21, at 35 (“[C]osts [of uncompensated tak-
ings] . . . include . . . the foregone investment caused by fear of such losses on the part 
of property owners more generally.”). 
25 See id. at 41-42 (discussing efficiency as a basic justification for compensation). 
26 See id. at 39 (“Takings result from a deliberate decision by political majorities to 
take the property of a minority.”). 
27 See id. at 38 (“Compensation . . . performs roughly the same function as manda-
tory insurance . . . .”). 
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It might be that the regulation undertaken in the first step was effi-
cient, and now, the promise of compensation generates a coalition 
that not only defeats incremental regulation but also reverses the ear-
lier, desirable law.  In any event, takings law is more a reference point 
than a source of rules applicable to the issues explored here.  Among 
other things, incrementalism may be a problem where there is no 
“property” right at issue, so reversibility by compensation is indepen-
dent of takings law. 
For reversibility by compensation to work, potential political allies 
must know that it will be forthcoming.  But retroactive compensation 
is hardly a constitutional right, and though it might be promised in a 
bargain, there is no way to enforce that bargain.  An association of 
store owners may gain an alliance with owners of commercial proper-
ties, who lost in the previous step, by promising to push for compensa-
tion even as they forestall further regulation.  The store owners, how-
ever, might back out or relax their efforts in the face of compromise 
legislation that proposes to exempt singly owned stores but does not 
offer compensation to those who had earlier been forced to invest in 
ramps.  The owners of commercial buildings may not be able to ob-
serve the effort expended by their coalition partners, and, in any event, the 
coalition between these nonrepeat players is likely to be unstable. 
If the promise to gain retroactive compensation is not credible, 
then the parties might agree to enforceable contracts.  The targets of 
the second step of regulation might simply contract to indemnify the 
losers in the first step for the cost of the political campaign or, more 
remarkably, for the cost of earlier compliance—for example, the ex-
penses incurred to install the ramps previously required.  Alternative-
ly, they might promise to pay only if they succeed in halting the in-
crementalist attack but do not gain retroactive compensation from the 
government.  These are risky contracts for the store owners to sign be-
cause they remove the incentive for aggressive political action on the 
part of the already regulated party.  A better contract might provide 
for partial compensation so that all the parties have reason to push for 
the results that they respectively seek.  This example assumes that leg-
islation rarely will compensate for the step-one mandates and burdens 
but not for the step-two regulation, though that risk could also be mi-
nimized by contract. 
I have hardly exhausted the possibilities here, but it is clear that the 
problem of incrementalism is greater, though not insoluble, when early-
stage compliance involves irretrievable investments.  And it is useful to 
repeat that whatever the level of irreversibility, the incrementalism 
LEVMORE_FINAL REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  7:47 AM 
2010] The Problem with Incrementalism 833 
problem is a possibility and not a fact.  If it is efficient (or right or fair) 
to ban smoking everywhere, then we should celebrate the ability of 
advocates to get us closer to that optimum by taking on interest 
groups one at a time.  If reversibility by compensation is intriguing, it 
is because this compensation does not undo socially efficient regulation. 
II.  LEARNING ON THE SLOPES 
An obvious and important argument for incremental change, 
whether by legislation, judicial decision, or regulation, is that we often 
learn from experience.  Lawmakers, and even the most avid propo-
nents of drug legalization, might think it wise to begin with the legali-
zation of marijuana alone in order to assess substitution effects, use by 
minors, and other consequences of legalization.  An incremental ap-
proach might overcome political opposition, but a secondary, ex-
pected benefit is that the design of a second step is likely to reflect les-
sons learned from the first.  A familiar pair, or entanglement, begins 
with a claim by opponents of a regulation that a given proposal starts 
down a slippery slope toward an endpoint that most citizens or legisla-
tors would regard as abhorrent.  There will be cases, real or imagined, 
where the first step will indeed lead eventually to this endpoint be-
cause of intransitivity, political exhaustion, coordination problems, or 
adherence to precedent.28  In turn, advocates for the proposed regula-
tion might say, first, that every good law occupies a compromise posi-
tion between unattractive extremes, such that mention of the slippery 
slope and its endpoint is a mere scare tactic, and second, that there is 
learning from experience on the slope itself.  We may not know at the 
outset where the social optimum is located, but it is normally sensible 
to gather information and then to reevaluate the likely costs and ben-
efits of further regulation (or deregulation).  As we will see, irreversibil-
ity also plays a role in this argument.  Lost in all this is the idea that 
 
28 For a catalogue of path-dependent accounts, see Volokh, supra note 10, at 1033-
34, 1051-52, 1052 n.71.  Volokh tells several stories in which small, incremental steps 
may lead to larger regulations that are initially undesired.  For example, the effects of 
gun registration might appear to be too small to merit a defense, but small steps may 
nevertheless aggregate to regulation that would be highly objectionable.  Id. at 1033.  
Registration might “create political momentum” for gun control.  Id. (emphasis omit-
ted).  Registration might reconfigure the opposition to gun control if fewer people 
own guns as a result.  Id.  For example, registration may lower the cost of confiscation, 
which could be a principal point of opposition to confiscation.  Id. at 1033-34.  Imple-
menting confiscation might become constitutional where it previously was not because 
the registration system can provide probable cause to search the houses of all regis-
tered gun owners.  Id. at 1034. 
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the value of experimentation does not necessarily translate into a 
good argument for learning through incrementalism. 
Consider a favorite example of the “slippery slopers”:  gun con-
trol.  Advocates of gun control might favor a first step of registration 
and licensing, but their opponents will raise the specter of the slippery 
slope and argue, among other things, that registration will make com-
plete confiscation easier.29  Confiscation of all firearms in the hands of 
private citizens is anathema to most audiences.30  Advocates might 
then claim that easy ownership of assault weapons and pocket-size 
handguns cannot possibly survive cost-benefit analysis; opponents will 
disagree and may intuit that every step down the slope weakens the 
likely configuration of defenders ready to halt the next step on the 
path to confiscation.  Advocates might also claim that a jurisdiction 
will learn a good deal from regulation.  If licensing or a ban on assault 
weapons leads to a dramatic reduction in violent crime, then there 
might be more support for further restrictions; if licensing instead 
leads to a serious increase in home burglaries and firearm theft, then 
a case might be made for requiring firearms to be kept under lock 
and key.  Most businesses and individuals engage in a kind of search, 
or experimental process, before committing to major changes, and 
there is every reason to think that governments ought to do the same. 
In principle, opponents might respond to the argument about 
learning from regulation by extracting a promise from advocates, how-
ever unenforceable, that if, for example, a ban on fully automatic wea-
pons does not produce an x percent improvement in some stated 
measure, then they must forswear a ban on semiautomatic weapons and 
perhaps even agree to rescind the first step—the ban on fully automatic 
weapons.  The promise might be slightly more convincing if the expe-
rimental ban were legislated with a sunset provision.  Similarly, consider 
a ban on smoking in bars that is opposed, in part, by bar owners who 
fear a reduction in patronage and claim more generally that tourism 
and convention business will wilt.  Advocates who argue that a substan-
tial health gain could be enjoyed at low cost might agree to rescind the 
ban if alcohol sales or the hotel occupancy rate dropped by more than 
 
29 Id. at 1033-34. 
30 See, e.g., Jon S. Vernick et al., Public Opinion Polling on Gun Policy, HEALTH AFF., 
Winter 1993, at 203 (reporting that sixty-four percent of poll respondents opposed a 
total gun ban); Marjorie Connelly, Public Supports Stricter Gun Control Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 1999, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/national/082699poll-watch.html 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (“The poll found only about a third of the public endorsed 
a ban on the sale of all handguns, with 61 percent opposed . . . .”). 
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five percent.  One way to advance the rescission promise is to recognize 
that if the health benefits could eventually be shown to exceed those 
projected by the advocates, it is almost certain that a subsequent, wider 
ban would be proposed. 
The absence of such promises might reflect their unenforceability, 
but it might also suggest that learning from regulation is largely a rhe-
torical device.  Very few advocates suggest sunset provisions or agree at 
the outset that the law ought to be revoked if the benefits of a regula-
tion fall short of some stated expectation.  Perhaps this is because data 
rarely influence the most passionate advocates and interest groups, 
whose positions usually reflect very strong preferences rather than the 
efficient position for the population at large.  If a local ban on smok-
ing in bars produces a dramatic decrease in patronage and tax reve-
nues from alcohol sales, then advocates of the ban are unlikely to apo-
logize and say that their cost-benefit claims were wrong.  They might 
believe that smokers moved to outdoor cafés or other unregulated lo-
cations and might propose that the ban ought to be extended to new 
venues.  Owners of bars do not internalize the nation’s healthcare 
costs, and the American Medical Association—a surprisingly late-
arriving advocate for smoking bans31—does not take responsibility for 
local tax revenues or the profits of tavern keepers.32 
Learning from regulation sometimes suggests careful experimen-
tation rather than legal incrementalism.  Indeed, the idea that states 
might be laboratories suggests not so much incrementalism as some-
what controlled, dramatic experiments.  In the case of access ramps, it 
would be useful to have data about the frequency of use and impact of 
ramps on workforce participation by disabled persons.  A structured 
experiment might do this best.  But, again, data matter more to agnos-
tic citizens and nonpartisan lawmakers than to passionate advocates.  
If there were no significant workforce effect, then advocates might 
 
31 See Alan Blum & Howard Wolinsky, AMA Rewrites Tobacco History, 346 LANCET 
261, 261 (1995) (“Today’s AMA should be commended for attempting to tackle the 
tobacco pandemic.  But it should be remembered that this organisation is a latecomer 
to the war.”). 
32 Both groups might care about the health of employees in bars and restaurants, 
but such employees might self-select.  It is interesting that neither advocates nor oppo-
nents of smoking bans produce evidence of the sentiments of the employees.  See gen-
erally H. Tang et al., Changes of Knowledge, Attitudes, Beliefs, and Preference of Bar Owner 
and Staff in Response to a Smoke-Free Bar Law, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 87 (2004) (conclud-
ing that the popularity of California’s smoke-free bar law increased over time, “even 
among bar owners and employees”). 
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note the importance of more accessible public transportation in 
bringing disabled employees to accommodating workplaces. 
In other settings, drastic changes might be more instructive than 
incremental ones.  A single month or year in which smoking was 
banned everywhere in one jurisdiction, in all eating and lodging es-
tablishments within it, or in all places on a rotating basis might yield 
useful data.  Learning from regulation is a good argument for change 
and experimentation, but it is not always, or even often, an argument 
for incremental change, especially where incrementalism operates on 
the legal system as a whole rather than on one or two jurisdictions as 
proving grounds.33 
Learning through incrementalism seems most likely where the so-
cial or political optimum is widely understood to be in a specified 
range such that there is little support for either endpoint of what 
might otherwise be a slippery slope.  Consider cases of minimum-age 
regulation.  Countries differ as to the appropriate minimum ages for 
drinking alcohol, driving, voting, and other rights and privileges;34 
apart from a few reconstructed prohibitionists, however, no one se-
riously espouses the notion that these minima ought to be in the thir-
ties or forties.  Incrementalism thus seems like the way to discover the 
“right” age at which one might be permitted to purchase alcoholic be-
verages.  But here, too, partisans will disagree about the lessons to be 
drawn from experience.  Imagine that advocates succeed in legislating 
a drinking age of nineteen, where it had previously been eighteen, 
with the claim that a higher age will reduce fatal automobile acci-
dents, inasmuch as many of those are associated with alcohol con-
sumption.  If the new drinking age does not then bring about a sub-
stantial decrease in fatalities, advocates might say that nineteen-year-
olds purchased alcoholic beverages for their younger friends and 
classmates or perhaps that cashiers and bartenders mistook eighteen-
year-olds for older patrons.  Advocates will agitate for a higher drink-
ing age of twenty or twenty-one, with the conviction that the new re-
striction will reduce accidents.  Of course, every categorical removal of 
 
33 See Listokin, supra note 1, at 483, 533-39 (describing the value of high-variance 
experiments, especially when they are reversible).  But reversibility for Listokin is not 
limited to compliance costs and is not at all focused on its role in creating or blocking 
political coalitions.  Id. at 533-34. 
34 Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (“The right of citizens of the United 
States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of age.”), with Costituzione della Re-
pubblica Italiana [COST.] art. 56(1) (Italy) (setting the minimum voting age for Senate 
elections at twenty-five). 
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drinkers—or drivers—will reduce the number of unwanted drivers.  It 
might be that a ban on drinking applied to everyone under eighteen, 
and then to twenty-five-year-olds as well, would reduce fatalities as 
much as a prohibition attached to everyone under nineteen.  Moreo-
ver, a policy driven by cost-benefit analysis would consider driving age 
as well as drinking age, though the private and social cost of an in-
crementally higher driving age will strike most lawmakers as greater 
than the cost of a year without alcohol.  The latter is especially diffi-
cult to quantify.  In any event, advocates rarely seem interested in ex-
periments that would illuminate cost-benefit calculations of this kind.  
Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) is likely to attach little value 
to the utility some people get from drinking.  Similarly, McDonald’s 
employs many high-school students and sells food to a young au-
dience, so it benefits from a low driving age and is unlikely to internal-
ize the benefits of higher driving ages as it wields its political power. 
Then there is the more obvious possibility that the lesson from 
regulation will be that a drinking age of nineteen rather than eigh-
teen does indeed significantly decrease fatalities.  If so, there will be 
pressure to raise the age further to twenty, and so on, until the returns 
from doing so seem modest.  If there were no evidence of a declining 
return as the minimum age increased, lawmakers might return to the 
minimum age of eighteen or even try seventeen because of interest-
group pressure.  The rhetoric or heartfelt arguments would include 
the point that it is unfair to restrict the freedom of eighteen-year-olds 
when the benefit is no greater than doing the same for other ages.  
Lawmakers may simply look for some political equilibrium where no 
organized interest has an enormous stake in the result.  If so, this 
would be a case in which the learning-from-regulation argument of-
fers significant support for incrementalism, though perhaps not for 
reasons normally contemplated. 
In sum, useful experiments come in disparate sizes, in the sense 
that one does not always wish for a variable to move in small steps.  
The argument for limiting law to modest experiments must be based 
on asymmetrical error costs or irreversibility.  But this is not the place 
for a full exploration of the distribution of error costs or for a conclu-
sion as to when incrementalism is the best means of experimentation.  
Incrementalism has been lauded with no specification of exactly when 
it is desirable.  My aim is simply to show that incrementalism comes 
with baggage and that the baggage is heaviest when there is irreversi-
bility.  We can now add the observation that larger, more dramatic 
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changes do not necessarily impose greater and more irreversible costs 
because useful experiments come in several sizes. 
III.  COMPENSATION AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 
A.  Undercompensation and Overcompensation 
The discussion in Part I emphasized the importance of irreversi-
bility in understanding the problem with incrementalism.  If irreversi-
ble costs were imposed on one interest group at step one, then that 
group would have no reason to join in a common defense against fur-
ther regulation at step two (unless the second step threatens addition-
al costs on the interest group burdened earlier).  Indeed, it might fa-
vor the regulation of its competitors at step two, either to raise their 
marginal costs or to drive some out of business.  But it was suggested 
that seemingly irreversible regulations could indeed be reversed, at 
least from the perspective of the directly burdened party, if compensa-
tion were retroactively provided.  If a property owner must retrofit a 
building with an access ramp costing $300,000, and the ramp brings in 
new business with a present value of $50,000, then compensation of 
$250,000 will leave the owner as well off as before.  Even if competing 
owners are not required to construct ramps, there will be neither envy 
nor competitive disadvantage.  This compensation could be provided 
at step one, but that is the stuff of a very broad takings law.  By con-
trast, it could be offered as part of a legislative package at step two.  
Compensation could come from the interest group at risk at step two, 
when that group seeks a defensive alliance, or it could come from the 
government if the allied groups succeed in obtaining retroactive com-
pensation.  Either way, the prospect of compensation might encour-
age a burdened party to join forces in opposing further regulation.  If 
the government, or an advocacy group, is thus stopped in its incre-
mentalist path, we might say, or wish, that the advocates (and more 
passive government constituents if they bear the financial burden of 
compensation) are penalized for pushing too far past the social opti-
mum.  Thus, they may be deterred from overreaching with their stra-
tegic incrementalism.  A more straightforward idea is that interest 
groups that were once divided are now encouraged to form the al-
liance they “ought” to have formed in the first place in order to de-
fend against the overachieving advocates. 
These perspectives are overly simplistic.  The possibility of com-
pensation complicates everything about incrementalism, the political 
process, and lawmaking.  In this Part, the focus is on the political 
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process, and especially on power politics involving interest groups, 
where the larger question is which rules of engagement are most likely 
to produce good laws.  If there is an incrementalism problem, and if 
compensation is part of the solution needed to align interest groups 
in a way that produces good law, then the important questions are (1) 
when to provide compensation and (2) whether to do so in a discre-
tionary or mandatory fashion.  In time, the discussion shifts away from 
power politics and toward the question of inefficiency, or rent seek-
ing.  At times, the analysis tracks that which is appropriate to a discus-
sion of takings law, retroactivity, or both; the novelty of the discussion 
here is preserved by focusing on the case for and against incrementalism. 
In the interest of reducing the number of balls in the air, I adhere 
to the remarkably and absurdly simplifying assumption that compen-
sation will be correctly calculated.35  Unfortunately, much complexity 
remains.  Compensation may be perfect, or even generous, but a 
property owner will recognize that she is sometimes better off if the 
government regulates or takes the property of others and allows her 
property to flourish because of the new government project or regula-
tion.  In these cases, we must again be anxious about the incentives to 
encourage or to discourage government interventions and to craft 
them one way or the other.  From the government’s perspective, even 
if compensation were perfectly calculated, there will always be budget 
constraints, and governments usually cannot collect from those who 
will benefit from the legal intervention.  Though I try to set these con-
siderations aside because they are associated with all government in-
terventions, rather than solely those that reflect incrementalism, they 
 
35 If this be not so, then incrementalism is but a small problem in a larger, more 
distressing picture of government regulation and takings.  When compensation is 
known to be ungenerous, affected parties can be expected to litigate and lobby to 
avoid having property or business interests regulated or condemned; if voluntary pur-
chases by the government—in the shadow of expected regulation or eminent domain 
proceedings—are also ungenerous, then private property owners will expend re-
sources to forestall government projects.  On the other hand, where compensation in 
excess of the private owner’s valuation is expected, there will be a push to have one’s 
property taken (or one’s business regulated) if the regulation is severe enough that it 
amounts to a compensable taking.  At the same time, if payments required of the gov-
ernment affect its inclination or ability to regulate or to undertake projects (as will 
surely be the case if the beneficiary of the government’s action is made to pay in one 
form or another), then we can expect a reduction in interventions.  Correspondingly, 
if the government can capture gains from beneficiaries while it undercompensates los-
ers, we can expect more intervention, unless the losers who could not extract more 
compensation are somehow relatively adept at blocking the government’s interven-
tions.  All this complexity can be avoided with the assumption of accurate compensation. 
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come into play when compensation is an ingredient in a suggested an-
tidote to the incrementalism problem. 
B.  Power Politics 
Thus far, compensation has been used to undo irreversibility and, 
in turn, to reduce the incrementalism problem.  It can, however, play 
a more important role if we make assumptions about the desirable 
constellation of interest groups.  A starting point of public-choice 
theory is that a well-organized interest group is likely to overachieve at 
the expense of dispersed interests, or losers.  The academic literature 
emphasizes the obvious problem of a group’s gaining too much of 
something;36 there is, however, an additional problem with regard to 
the form of government activity.  For example, it is not simply that the 
military budget will be larger because of the efforts of well-organized 
contractors but also that it is likely to be organized around particular 
pieces of new equipment or military bases that benefit particular in-
terests but may be suboptimal. 
A suggested antidote to this process problem is to set well-
matched interest groups against one another.37  For example, if teach-
ers’ salaries were to be funded by a tax on milk, or milk subsidies re-
quired a reduction in the education budget, or perhaps both, then 
dairy farmers and public school teachers might lobby and even 
present useful information to the legislature.  A fair fight might allow 
unattached legislators to resolve the matter in the public’s interest.  A 
skeptic might wonder why interest groups would abide by the rules of 
battle, inasmuch as those rules could be altered by legislation.  There 
is also the question why well-matched opponents should be expected 
to leave a desirable result on the battlefield.  But a guarded optimist 
could think that there will be pressure to abide by the rule of well-
matched opponents and that the outcome of such a battle is likely to 
be superior to the outcome that would obtain if either organized  
interest was able to operate at the expense of a dispersed, disorga-
nized interest.  A true optimist might look to campaign-finance 
reform, education, and a free press to make interest-group activity 
useless when not directed toward helping the polity find socially de-
 
36 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 57 
tbl.1.1 (4th ed. 2007) (charting the costs and benefits of various legislative processes); 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 
IN LAW 251-54 (2009) (discussing the “demand side” of legislative goods). 
37 See Tullock, supra note 4, at 46 (proposing the notion that if interest groups 
were pitted against one another, the allocation of resources would be more efficient). 
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sirable outcomes, but a pragmatic optimist is prepared to look for a 
second-best power-politics process.  Finally, another interesting possi-
bility is that it may be easier for voters or public-spirited lawmakers to 
assess the strength of interest groups than to locate social optima 
more directly.  Even an enlightened lawmaker may be unsure where 
to ban smoking; the same lawmaker may do well to leave it to associa-
tions representing owners of different kinds of establishments and to 
the American Cancer Society to bargain for the “optimal” ban or to 
battle for votes in one city council after another in order to set the 
rules.  The case for arranged battle is not unlike that in favor of the 
adversary system in litigation, where the hope must also be that com-
petition between advocates will produce the right result. 
With this in mind, we can revisit the history of smoking bans.  Ad-
vocates may not have been terribly well organized when they began 
investing in political activity, but an early target was airline cabins, as 
to which the opposition was dispersed, though perhaps no more so 
than the advocates.38  Following a period during which airlines agreed 
to nonsmoking sections, legislation proceeded incrementally over the 
course of a decade, first by prohibiting smoking on domestic flights 
under two hours, then on those shorter than six hours, and finally, in 
2000, on all domestic flights.39  The airlines had little reason to fight 
these bans because smokers could not migrate to unregulated close 
substitutes.  At the local level, smoking bans did not follow a single 
path, but a ban on pipes and cigars in some venues was followed by a 
more complete ban on smoking in restaurants, which was often fol-
lowed by a proposal to extend the ban to bars, then to hotels, then to 
parks and beaches in some jurisdictions, and, in several jurisdictions, 
to all indoor places except private residences.40  In some jurisdictions, 
bans began with office buildings, where secondhand smoke was seen 
as a matter of employment conditions; there, again, the losers would 
 
38 See Steven A. Mirmina, Aviation Safety and Security—Legal Developments, 63 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 547, 558-59 (1998) (charting the history of nonsmoking sections and smoking 
bans on airlines). 
39 See id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 41706(a) (2006) (prohibiting smoking on all  
domestic flights). 
40 California, for example, pursued aggressive regulation of smoking in public 
places.  It passed the Smoke-Free Act in 1994, prohibiting smoking in all places of em-
ployment.  Ch. 310, 1994 Cal. Stat. 2055 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 6404.5 (West 2003)).  Some of California’s cities have passed yet more stringent local 
laws.  The city of Calabasas, for example, prohibits smoking in all indoor and outdoor 
areas of the city, except for a handful of designated smoking areas.  CALABASAS, CAL., 
CODE § 8.12.040(A)–(B) (2009), available at http://www.municode.com/Resources/ 
gateway.asp?pid=16235&sid=5. 
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have been dispersed employees not championed by any organized 
business interest.41  An idealist might say that, in incrementalist fa-
shion, the law found its way to the social optimum, which varies across 
disparate jurisdictions.  An optimistic public-choice theorist might say 
that although we are uncertain of the optimal intervention, at least 
similarly empowered interest groups were eventually pitted against 
one another and, apparently, equilibrium was reached.  We might 
think of this as politically optimal or at least as reflecting the best we 
can expect of power politics in the real world. 
I return now to the idea of reversal through compensation.   
Imagine again that restaurant owners lose on their own at step one, 
but then bar owners, when threatened at step two, induce restaurant 
owners, and perhaps unregulated hotel owners as well, to join in the 
defense.  The coalition succeeds, in this hypothetical, in preserving 
smoke-friendly drinking establishments and also in reversing the ban 
on smoking in restaurants.  Indeed, this reversal was “promised” to the 
restaurant owners as the reward for their participation in this round of 
power politics.  If the reversal seems implausible, consider the reversal 
of regulations regarding motorcycle helmets in some states (and the 
increase in highway speed limits after they were reduced)42 and the vo-
 
41 See, e.g., Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 244, sec. 5, § 1399-o, 1989 N.Y. Laws 2328, 2329-34 
(codified as amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-o (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 
2009)) (banning smoking in all enclosed workplaces).  The present law, however, ex-
empts (1) private homes and automobiles, (2) hotel and motel rooms, (3) retail tobacco 
businesses, (4) private clubs, (5) cigar bars, (6) outdoor areas of restaurants and bars, 
and (7) enclosed rooms in restaurants, bars, convention halls, and so forth, when hosting 
private functions organized for the promotion and sampling of tobacco products.  N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009).  This law amended the prior 
law, which in 2003 had banned smoking in most indoor areas open to the public.  Cf. Act 
of Mar. 26, 2003, ch. 13, sec. 4, § 1399-q, 2003 N.Y. Laws 109, 113-14 (codified as 
amended at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2009)). 
42 For example, in Florida, 
a person over 21 years of age may operate or ride upon a motorcycle without 
wearing protective headgear securely fastened upon his or her head if such 
person is covered by an insurance policy providing for at least $10,000 in med-
ical benefits for injuries incurred as a result of a crash while operating or rid-
ing on a motorcycle. 
FLA. STAT. § 316.211(3)(b) (2009).  This section amended the prior Florida law, which 
had required all motorcyclists to wear protective headgear.  Act of June 16, 1971, ch. 
71-135, § 316.287, 1971 Fla. Laws 431, 543 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. 
§ 316.211(3)(b)). 
 At the federal level, states were initially required to lower their highway speed lim-
its to fifty-five miles per hour in order to receive certain federal funds.  Emergency 
Highway Energy Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-239, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 1046, 1046-47 
(1974), repealed by National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
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latility of depreciation schedules in the Internal Revenue Code;43 re-
versals are not terribly uncommon, especially if we think of deregula-
tion as reversal.  If restaurant smoking were to be permitted once 
more, then one could argue that the earlier ban on smoking in res-
taurants was the product of a divide-and-conquer strategy eventually 
revealed to have been an instance of the incrementalism problem.44 
Reversal through compensation, or compensation in the event of 
regulatory reversal, can be justified by thinking about behavior in the 
shadow of retroactive lawmaking.  For example, following a tightening 
of pollution laws, there is the provocative argument that polluters can 
be encouraged to anticipate (rather than battle) more demanding en-
vironmental laws, which would hold the polluters liable for injuries 
that would have been avoided had they abided by the standards sub-
sequently set.  Similarly, advocates of smoking bans—though much 
harder to identify than emitters of particular pollutants—should per-
haps compensate the restaurant owners if the ban is reversed.  The ar-
gument will seem a strange one, especially because its logic also sug-
gests that when the same smoking ban was first instituted, the 
restaurant owners should themselves have owed damages for failing to 
ban smoking in the years prior to the ban, bounded only by the sta-
tute of limitations.45  Both applications of the logic suffer from the 
 
59, § 205(d)(1), 109 Stat. 568, 577.  The law was modified by Congress in the late 1980s 
to increase the limit to sixty-five miles per hour on certain roads, see Surface Transpor-
tation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 174, 101 
Stat. 132, 218, but then repealed in 1995, returning the issue completely to the states, 
see National Highway System Designation Act § 205(d)(1).  Since that time many states 
have raised their speed limits, though uniformity is still lacking.  See, e.g., Robert E. 
King & Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158-62 
(1999) (examining the federal maximum speed limit’s effect on Montana’s legislative 
effort to replace speed limits with a law requiring drivers to operate their vehicles at a 
“reasonable” speed).  For example, the current speed limit on interstate highways in 
Idaho is seventy-five miles per hour.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-654(2)(c) (2008).  In Illi-
nois, the limit is sixty-five miles per hour.  625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-601 (2008). 
43 See generally John P. Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L. 
REV. 483 (1985) (reviewing the history of accelerating and tightening depreciation de-
ductions as well as the related investment tax credit). 
44 Note that this reversal-by-compensation strategy is applied here even though a 
smoking ban, unlike a ramp requirement, does not represent an irreversible invest-
ment.  See supra note 17 (discussing the irreversibility of a ramp requirement). 
45 If this argument is fashioned as a takings claim, then we need some baseline 
understanding of property rights and smoking rights.  As a tort claim, it is unconvinc-
ing because the primary wrongdoers are the smokers (or tobacco companies) and not 
the owners of facilities in which secondhand smoke is experienced.  Still, there re-
mains the idea developed in the retroactivity, or legal-transitions, literature that re-
troactive liability will discourage parties with superior information about desirable le-
gal change from lobbying or otherwise working against improvements in law.  See Louis 
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problem of identifying who, exactly, ought to pay.  But this is not the 
place to puzzle over the literature on retroactivity, and I prefer instead 
to emphasize that selective compensation might continue to be fa-
vored on the instrumentalist ground that it encourages the earlier los-
ers (here the restaurant owners) to form a coalition with those later 
threatened (here the bar owners) exactly as they might have done in 
the earlier time period had a collective action problem or a misap-
prehension about the path of regulation not interfered. 
If mandatory compensation for regulatory reversals can improve 
power politics, there remains the question whether it is feasible.  Law 
has struggled with the question how to define and compensate regula-
tory takings, and it has struggled with rules that might be regarded as 
arbitrary.46  Compensation for burdensome regulations only if reversed, 
or only for those reversed after subsequent, incrementally more severe 
regulations are voted on, presents considerable difficulties.  No legal 
 
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 551-52 (1986) 
(showing that transition rules, including retroactivity, can enforce the legal system’s 
goals); Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 
1658-59 (1999) (elaborating the argument that parties with information can be en-
couraged to anticipate legal change through retroactive liability and other means).  A 
major problem with this argument is that it raises the stakes associated with change 
and might actually lead interest groups to block progress rather than to accelerate it. 
 Note that the description in the text passes over the puzzle of why choice is so 
rarely offered in the absence of legal intervention.  Why, in other words, are nonsmok-
ers so powerful politically yet so weak in the marketplace that they could rarely be satis-
fied by entrepreneurs who sorted them by offering nonsmoking environments? 
46 The Supreme Court has stated that  
[t]he question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.  While this 
Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole,” this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” 
for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than re-
main disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.  
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)).  As for the rules themselves, there is, for example, the permanent-physical-
presence test articulated in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.  458 U.S. 419 
(1982).  Under this rule, a taking will be found if the governmental action imposes “a 
permanent physical occupation of property,” irrespective of whether the regulation 
secures a public policy benefit or “has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”  
Id. at 434-35.  Similarly, there is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which holds that 
a taking may be found when the state deprives a property owner of “all economically 
beneficial uses of the land.”  505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
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system calculates and awards damages arising out of a regulation like a 
smoking ban when there is a safety claim and when net losses to restau-
rateurs and other property owners are difficult to assess.  Similarly, the 
burden of gun registration or the private cost of a prohibition on small 
handguns or assault weapons is difficult to calculate.  The net losses of 
an age cohort that was “wrongly” denied the right to engage in an activ-
ity are even more difficult to calculate.  The compensation solution to 
the problem of incrementalism seems feasible only for a subset of cases, 
and it is not a subset particularly rich in reversals. 
Moreover, the feasibility issue is not limited to damage assess-
ments.  There are significant difficulties in identifying reversals of prior 
policies.  A freeze in the minimum wage, despite inflation, might be a 
reversal.  Many changes in tax law, including changes in rates and de-
preciation schedules, necessarily reverse prior law.  Some might view a 
regulatory regime requiring elevators rather than access ramps as a 
regulatory reversal, while others might view it as a further step in the 
regulatory trajectory.  The problem is real as well as pecuniary because 
interest groups will have reason to tweak legislation in order to create 
a regulatory reversal where they would not otherwise have wanted one 
or, on the other side, to frame legislation so that it is not deemed a re-
versal in order to avoid the compensation requirement.  For example, 
lawmakers required passive-restraint systems in automobiles on the 
way to requiring airbags.47  Once airbags were required, auto-engaging 
seatbelts were no longer mandatory.48  If this were to be regarded as a 
reversal, so that compensation for the passive-restraint step would be 
required, then the airbag regulation might have taken a less efficient 
form in order to avoid the compensation requirement.49 
Finally, in many cases, the problem of identifying regulatory rever-
sals and that of measuring damages run together and make the com-
pensation solution infeasible.  Licensing requirements in any profes-
sion may become incrementally more burdensome, yet each new 
burden also raises the barrier against new competitors.  Clients might 
be the group most deserving of compensation, but we do not think of 
them as implicated in the divide-and-conquer problem. 
 
47 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, subsecs. S4.1.4, S4.1.5.3 (2008) (mandating that passive-
restraint systems be installed in all cars manufactured after September 1, 1989, and 
mandating airbag installation in all cars manufactured after September 1, 1997). 
48 See id. § 571.208, subsec. S4.1.5.3 (permitting the passive-restraint requirement 
to be met with airbags alone). 
49 The law might have given manufacturers a choice, even though airbags were 
superior and bifurcation might have sacrificed some economies of scale. 
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In short, compensation is in theory a tool with which to alleviate 
the incrementalism problem, especially when irreversibility is present.  
Once we move away from the easiest cases, however, it is as difficult to 
identify regulatory reversals (as well as to assess net damages) as it is to 
pinpoint problems with incrementalism.  A respectable case can surely 
be made for compensation following regulatory reversals—with an eye 
toward getting the power politics right in the first place—as it is com-
parable to the argument for compensating all apparent regulatory tak-
ings.  But the argument is almost surely too complicated:  execution is 
too difficult, and there remains the question whether compensation 
ought to be paid by taxpayers (in which case there will likely be insuf-
ficient opposition to a regulatory reversal), by advocates (past or 
present), or by previous beneficiaries.  Compensation might in theory 
solve the incrementalism problem, but it is a theory unlikely to trans-
late into practice. 
C.  Discretionary Compensation and Unproblematic Minimum-Age Legislation 
Nothing stops the political process, including bargaining among 
interest groups, from producing compensation for some regulatory re-
versals.  Just as a government sometimes buys property rights when it 
could have achieved its ends by regulating without paying compensa-
tion under the Fifth Amendment, so, too, can a government, or 
another interest group, compensate ramp builders or other earlier 
losers, even though it need not do so.  It is unusual for a government 
to pay for past compliance with its rules but not so unusual for it to 
pay for new regulations—especially because it can normally substitute 
direct activity for mandates.  Thus, the government can provide air 
marshals on commercial airline flights, or it can require airlines to 
provide certified security personnel.50  It can require airlines to pro-
vide the seats for these marshals, though it could have advanced the 
cause of security and the economic health of the airlines by buying 
tickets for the marshals.51  A government that requires airbags, smoke 
alarms, or vaccinations can presumably offer to supply them as well. 
This point about discretionary compensation will seem more 
plausible if the likelihood of payment through a kind of logroll is in-
cluded in the calculus.  A government might require airbags at the au-
tomakers’ expense, but it might in the same legislative breath, or ses-
 
50 Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 1544.223(b) (2009) (requiring commercial carriers to provide 
seats for federal air marshals). 
51 Cf. id. § 1544.223(c) (requiring air marshals’ seats to be provided free of charge). 
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sion, buy more vehicles than expected for its own fleet.  Moreover, the 
government might change the tax law regarding net-operating-loss 
carryovers in a way that benefits these losers.  In any event, there are 
good, if counterintuitive, reasons for unfunded mandates, especially 
where powerful interest groups are concerned.52 
 It is noteworthy that our experience with discretionary compensa-
tion is consistent with the thinking offered here on troubling incre-
mentalism.  Following an increase in the drinking age, no political sys-
tem is likely to compensate those who must now wait longer to drink.  
Interestingly, step-by-step changes with respect to such minimum-age 
rules are free from the incrementalism problem.  That no one—even 
among those who think that they can distinguish derisible slippery 
slopes from necessary compromise among interests and values—
regards minimum-age legislation as played out on a slippery slope is 
perhaps a clue rather than an oversight.  Minimum-age legislation is 
likely free of the incrementalism problem because it does not divide 
and conquer defending groups.  Advocates did succeed in raising the 
minimum drinking age from eighteen to nineteen, then from nine-
teen to twenty, and finally to twenty-one.53  But there are a few reasons 
why this is different from incremental building-code changes and 
smoking bans.  First, a single age cohort is generally not a well-
 
52 See generally Julie A. Roin, Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regula-
tions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 351 (1999) (examining the positive attributes of unfunded 
mandates).  An important feature of Professor Roin’s discussion is the political power 
of states and localities.  See id. at 378 (“State and local governments, or the interests 
that they tax or service, may balance or offset those interest groups that stand to gain 
from intergovernmental mandates.”).  In particular, she focuses on the ability of state 
and local governments to form coalitions as repeat players and to organize in the halls 
of Congress.  See id. at 379 (“Indeed, these subordinate governments might lobby for 
funded—or, of course, for overfunded—mandates when there is . . . some political 
gain to a claim that the federal government forced certain policies on the states and 
localities . . . .”).  This power might explain why the incrementalism problem does not 
often arise by dividing and conquering jurisdictions. 
53 Wisconsin, for example, lowered its drinking age to eighteen in 1971.  Act of 
Mar. 22, 1972, § 5, 1971 Wis. Sess. Laws 509, 510 (current version at WIS. STAT. 
§ 125.02(8m) (2009)).  Prior to that time, the drinking age had been twenty-one for all 
wine and spirits.  Id.  It was raised to nineteen in 1984, see Act of Nov. 3, 1983, § 5, 1983 
Wis. Sess. Laws 786, 787 (current version at WIS. STAT. § 125.02(8m)) (raising the 
drinking age to nineteen effective July 1, 1984), and to twenty-one in 1986, see Act of 
June 7, 1986, §§ 4, 55, 1985 Wis. Sess. Laws 1484, 1484, 1493 (current version at WIS. 
STAT. § 125.02(8m)) (adjusting the minimum drinking age to twenty-one and grandfa-
thering in nineteen- and twenty-year-olds).  See WIS. STAT. § 125.02(8m) (defining the 
current legal drinking age as twenty-one). 
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organized political interest.54  Second, to the extent that other interest 
groups are organized and serve as proxies for others, such as bar own-
ers serving as proxies for eighteen-year-olds who wish to drink, these 
other interests are not divisible.  After all, no identifiable set of taverns 
specializes in serving eighteen-year-olds, and, even in college towns, 
no bar owners would be expected to turn, in a second regulatory step, 
against other bars able to serve nineteen-year-olds.  To the extent that 
vendors of alcohol are the organized interest in play, minimum-age 
legislation does not present an incrementalism problem because the 
relevant interest group is not divisible in the same manner as restau-
rants and bars, or owners of new buildings and old buildings. 
There is a third and final reason why minimum-age legislation, 
though historically incrementalist, does not run into the incrementalism 
problem.  Even if we think of each age cohort as an interest group, 
their disorganization could be overcome at the polls if each cohort 
had millions of voters likely to take their drinking rights seriously.  If 
citizens born in 1960 found in 1979 that they would have to wait 
another year to purchase alcoholic beverages, they might have been 
expected to seek revenge against the legislators who raised the mini-
mum age, especially if the age had been raised more than once at the 
cohort’s expense.  In fact, legislators enacted multiple, staggered in-
creases in the minimum drinking age in one step and postponed ef-
fective dates so that those old enough to vote had no objection.55  In 
 
54 I leave aside a hypothetical assault on sixty-five-year-olds, who might be well 
represented by the AARP. 
55 Even in those states with the most frequent changes, there has not been a progres-
sion that looks like a divide-and-conquer strategy.  Georgia, for example, legislated twen-
ty-one as the minimum age for purchasing alcohol in 1938 (after the end of Prohibition 
in 1933, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).  See Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Al-
coholic Beverages and Liquors, No. 297, § 15, 1937–1938 Ga. Laws 103, 118-19 (1938) 
(current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23 (2003 & Supp. 2009)) (prohibiting the sale of 
alcoholic beverages to minors); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104 (1937) (setting twenty-one as 
the age of majority).  In 1972, Georgia lowered the age of majority to eighteen (this was a 
period in which drinking ages and voting ages dropped to conform to the age for mili-
tary conscription).  See Act of Mar. 10, 1972, No. 862, sec. 1, § 74-104, 1972 Ga. Laws 193, 
194-95 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23).  In 1980, Georgia again raised the 
age of majority, and thus the drinking age, to nineteen.  See Act of Apr. 13, 1981, No. 732, 
sec. 22, § 5A-510, 1981 Ga. Laws 1269, 1281-83 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-
23).  Finally, in 1985, Georgia raised the age to twenty-one (to take effect in 1986) in an-
ticipation of a federal regulation.  See Act of Apr. 3, 1985, No. 562, sec. 3, § 3-3-23, 1985 
Ga. Laws 753, 755-57 (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-23).  The minimum age 
was set at twenty for the 1985 transition year.  See id.  Effective dates were always set such 
that no cohort ever lost the ability to purchase alcoholic beverages.  Therefore, no two 
cohorts were divided by the proposed effective dates.  The pattern is best described as 
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short, although a young cohort might wish it had worked against a se-
ries of changes long before it attained voting age, there was not 
another cohort from which it could have been divided and con-
quered—and certainly not another that would have been expected to 
turn on it once itself regulated.  The incrementalism problem thus 
gives us a nice way to understand why minimum-age legislation has 
not seemed as troubling to the slippery slopers as, for example, gun 
control.56 
Consider in this regard two kinds of incrementalism in the area of 
employment-discrimination law.  The first concerns a statute that ap-
plies to employers with more than x employees, but, over time, 
amendments broaden its reach to employers with fewer employees.57  
When large employers are targeted in the first step, family-owned 
businesses and local chambers of commerce stay out of the fray.  In-
deed, they might regard the legislation as welcome because it increas-
es costs for their most threatening competitors.  The second kind of 
incrementalism involves an expansion of protected classes by statute, 
regulation, or judicial decision.  A statute that permitted employment 
claims with respect to race and sex might over time add pregnancy, 
sexual preference, and age as relevant characteristics.58  This may be 
 
legislating an increase in the drinking age without disappointing the expectations of any 
cohort already old enough to vote.  
56 In the case of gun control, one would not expect the losers in an early step to 
turn and support more regulation in a subsequent step.  But there is the potential for a 
divide-and-conquer strategy if hunters care mostly about rifles and only support the 
absolutist position because they need allies or believe that the slippery slope will con-
sume their passion.  In any event, it is not an incrementalism problem of the worst 
kind because hunters and gun collectors, for example, are not competitors. 
 In the case of abortion rights, the slippery-slope claim is familiar but an incremen-
talism problem seems unlikely.  Both sides in the debate are well organized.  More im-
portantly, voters are well-informed and involved, so legislation and judicial decisions 
seem to reflect a political and legal equilibrium rather than an incrementalist strategy.  
It is hard to see an interest on either side turning on its competitor.   
57 Compare, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 
253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)) (defining covered employ-
ers covered by Title VII to include those having twenty-five or more employees), with 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2(2), § 701(b), 
86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) (extending the scope 
of Title VII to employers with fifteen or more employees). 
58 Compare, e.g., Civil Rights Act § 703, 78 Stat. at 255-57 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin”), with Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-555, sec. 1, § 701(k), 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) (expanding discrimination on the basis of sex to include discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy). 
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incrementalism, but defenders (and even advocates) are unlikely to 
divine the order in which these other protected classes will be added.  
There is no constitutional or natural ordinal ranking of attributes or 
classes.  As such, they might underinvest in litigation or other defen-
sive tactics.  There is a small divide-and-conquer problem to the extent 
that some employers, and even industries, are more at risk with re-
spect to some attributes than others.  But for the most part, the ex-
panded protection affects the same employers, and there is no danger 
that those who lost in the first round of legislation will favor further 
regulation in a subsequent round.  If there is neither irreversibility 
nor shifting coalitions, then there is not an incrementalism problem.  
By contrast, the expansion of coverage to smaller employers does 
present an incrementalism problem, though not one made more se-
vere by irreversibility (except that employment rights are rarely with-
drawn).  Ultimately, it seems that we should be more wary of incre-
mentalism as applied to employer size than to protected classes of 
employees. 
D.  Incrementalism and Rent Seeking 
The discussion thus far has approached the incrementalism prob-
lem, and the use of compensation as an antidote, with interest-group 
coalitions, or power politics, in mind.  The root of the problem, as 
identified and discussed in Part I, is that strategic incrementalism can 
divide and conquer groups.  It can then push regulation far beyond 
the social optimum or perhaps regulate the “wrong” activities rather 
than too many.  One solution to this problem—realigning divided in-
terest groups by promising compensation in the event of a regulatory 
reversal—appears to be theoretically attractive but exceedingly diffi-
cult to design and execute.  In this Section, the discussion turns away 
from the previous focus on divided and then realigned interest groups 
and toward the problem of interest-group activity itself.  This problem 
is often described as one of rent seeking, an expression that refers to 
socially wasteful activity undertaken to influence law.59  If interest 
 
59 Rent seeking can be understood by beginning with the canonical case in which 
the government has a monopoly to bestow, perhaps in the form of a license.  If the 
monopoly position is worth x dollars to the monopolist, a supplicant (or interest 
group) would presumably pay as much as x-1 dollars to acquire the position.  One 
famous advance in public-choice theory was the realization that economists had unde-
restimated the “problem with monopoly” by focusing only on the deadweight loss 
caused by the monopolist who sells less of a good, at a price higher than marginal cost, 
than would sellers in a competitive market.  See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of 
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groups know that compensation is available, they will expend re-
sources, or seek economic rents, in attempts to recover their costs, 
though these costs have passed under the metaphorical bridge. 
One way to combat this waste would be to insist on the eradication 
of discretionary compensation.  A government would discourage rent 
seeking if it could somehow precommit never to subsidize an industry 
and never to impose licensing requirements or tariffs that protect an 
industry.  Although uncompensated takings surely generate rent-
seeking behavior, from a public-choice perspective, it is difficult to un-
derstand why scholars pay so much more attention to government tak-
ings than to government subsidies or other programs.60  The two can be 
 
Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 231-32 (1967) (explaining that welfare 
loss from monopoly also comes from the resources producers spend successfully or 
unsuccessfully trying to obtain a monopoly).  Consumers who would be willing to pay 
more than marginal cost might be denied the good because of the monopoly-pricing 
strategy, even though it would be efficient to transfer the good to those consumers.  
The public-choice insight is that the social cost of a monopoly is much greater than the 
aggregated deadweight loss because it includes the cost of wasteful rent-seeking activi-
ty.  Id.; see also Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 807, 809-15 (1975) (modeling the social costs of monopoly “as the sum of 
deadweight loss and the additional loss resulting from the competition to become a 
monopolist”).  The resulting cost could be as great as or even greater than the ex-
pected profit from monopoly status.  It could exceed the profit, for example, if compe-
tition caused one who had invested, say, 0.5x dollars in quest of the monopoly (worth x 
dollars) to regard that investment as a sunk cost, such that it was worth spending 
another x-1 dollars at the margin to acquire the monopoly.  In principle, there is no 
upper limit on the total social loss that profit-maximizing entities competing for the 
monopoly might generate. 
 If aspiring monopolists simply bid for the license by paying money, then we have a 
mere transfer payment.  In that case, there is no social waste apart from the dead-
weight loss attributable to monopoly pricing, though we might be offended if the gov-
ernment sold some things in this manner.  Thus, if a cable channel is auctioned off to 
the highest bidder, we might bemoan the loss of a medium for public television or 
other noncommercial use, but at least the resource will have gone to the commercial 
user who values it most highly.  On the other hand, if a politician assigns the channel, 
various broadcasters or other interests might try to influence the political decision with 
campaign contributions, outright bribes, personal favors, paid “factfinding” trips, or 
multiple-martini lunches.  Some of these involve real waste; the politician is unlikely to 
value the bloated lunch as much as it costs a supplicant to provide it, and a highly paid 
job for the politician’s family member is unlikely to match that employee with a job 
well suited to her skills.  Rent seeking encompasses such waste.  A plausible policy goal, 
or source of a theory about law, might be to structure rules to minimize rent seeking 
and thereby reduce social waste. 
60 Government “givings” also present incrementalism problems, especially if the 
givings, or benefits, are meant to produce reactions.  I limit the discussion here to 
burdens and will confront givings issues in future work, where judicial, rather than leg-
islative, decisions are at the forefront.  For the present, note that givings necessarily 
come at a cost, and unless this cost is spread across dispersed taxpayers and citizens, it 
will activate interest groups.  In many settings, this effect is orthogonal to the incre-
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equally wasteful in rent-seeking terms.  But much as the discussion here 
considers regulatory reversals and other aspects of incrementalism 
without reinventing the wheel of takings law, it is widely acknowledged 
that governments can subsidize one group at the expense of others.  It 
may simply be too difficult to establish baselines from which unequal 
subsidies would be barred.  Nevertheless, unfunded mandates may be 
acceptable or even desirable and, at the other extreme, a requirement 
that mandates be treated as compensable takings might also be accept-
able.  The worst choice, from the rent-seeking perspective, is one that 
allows interest groups to lobby for compensation.  It is this norm of oc-
casional, discretionary compensation that a legal system would strive to 
avoid in order to minimize rent seeking. 
Discretionary compensation for regulatory burdens doubles the 
rent-seeking problem.  Consider, for example, a proposal that old 
buildings be required to incorporate access ramps.  An owner might 
face a $1 million cost.  That owner might spend up to $1 million to fo-
restall the regulation or to gain an exemption from it.  In a world 
where regulations are frequently held to amount to takings, constitu-
tional obligations to compensate property owners dominate any in-
centives to lobby against the regulation.  Of course, the compensation 
requirement itself might decrease advocates’ likelihood of success in 
gaining passage of the regulation such that we cannot say whether 
compensation, even properly measured, is socially efficient.  But with 
discretionary compensation, things are more complicated.  The opti-
mistic story is that the expected cost of each ramp decreases because 
there is some chance of full or partial compensation.  If so, the af-
fected property owner will not invest as heavily in preventing the regu-
lation.  From a rent-seeking perspective, this is good news.  From a 
power-politics perspective, however, it may be unfortunate inasmuch 
as it is desirable to have someone argue against the regulation to pre-
vent organized beneficiaries from too often getting their way at the 
 
mentalism problem.  Thus, if a proposed road imposes costs and benefits, interest 
groups will line up to avoid one road and enjoy the other.  A tax scheme that took 
from the winners and compensated the losers might work wonders, but in most cases 
incrementalism is not implicated.  See Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls and Their Recapture 
(discussing whether there is a feasible system to recapture gains in real estate value re-
sulting from government action), in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:  LAND VALUE CAPTURE 
AND COMPENSATION 15, 15-19 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J. Misczynski eds., 1978).  A 
proposed road’s precise location, once worked out, sends strong signals about the 
road’s likely extension, so that there is more information rather than more dividing 
and conquering. 
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expense of dispersed taxpayers.  It is, however, the rent-seeking pers-
pective that is pursued in this Section. 
There is also a pessimistic, and probably more plausible, story.  It is 
that the property owner must first worry about the $1 million loss the 
ramp regulation would impose, and then, if the regulation passes or 
looks likely to pass, the property owner has the chance to recoup the $1 
million, provided that compensation can be obtained.  If the steps are 
thus decoupled, the rent-seeking potential doubles because there is first 
a $1 million loss to worry about and then a $1 million gain to pursue.  If 
compensation is either mandated or forbidden, and there is no cheat-
ing through other legislation, there is $1 million, rather than $2 mil-
lion, at stake, and there is less rent-seeking activity.  This suggests yet 
another reason why the compensation solution to the incrementalism 
problem explored in Sections I.C and III.B above may do more harm 
than good.  If compensation accompanies a regulatory reversal, then it 
will likely double the rent-seeking activity; the reversal is, in the lan-
guage of this discussion, discretionary.61  In short, from a rent-seeking 
perspective, the incrementalism problem is made worse rather than 
better by guaranteeing compensation for overregulation at the first 
step, inasmuch as this overregulation is determined by the discretionary 
step of voting down further regulation at a second step. 
It is interesting that, as a matter of political practice, we do not 
find compensation precisely where the problem of incrementalism is 
most apparent.  I resist starting with minimum-age legislation because 
I have already argued that there is, strictly speaking, unlikely to be an 
incrementalism problem in these settings.  It is more interesting, 
therefore, that we rarely find government-provided compensation 
when an earlier safety standard is overruled.  There is neither com-
 
61 The owner of a preexisting commercial building will fight the ramp require-
ment because there is no other interest group to ally with and because the regulatory 
burden is serious.  I have described the effort to get residential property owners to join 
in the defense as fruitless.  But if incrementalist regulation begins to burden shops, it is 
possible that the earlier, regulated property owner can be induced to join in the de-
fense—rather than root for the offense—in the interest of a level, competitive playing 
field.  The inducement might be in the form of a reversal such that there would be a 
package combining the defeat of the proposal to expand retrofitting with a reversal of 
the earlier regulation.  If this were about incremental smoking bans, a reversal would 
be valuable to the previously regulated restaurants.  If it is about “irreversible” regula-
tions, like costly ramps, reversal probably requires compensation.  If the ramps in ques-
tion could not have met a cost-benefit test, then the reversal does not eliminate the 
social cost of the regulation, but from the private party’s point of view, reversal can be 
accomplished through compensation.  In these settings, it is surely the case that there 
is double rent seeking at stake. 
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pensation for the victims when the old standard is deemed too lax, 
nor compensation for the precaution takers though the old regulation 
is regarded as too extreme and costly.  There are many possible ex-
planations for this pattern, but a novel one is that we somehow recog-
nize that such compensation would increase rent seeking.  If we are to 
compensate for the government’s past errors, it makes sense to make 
the compensation nondiscretionary, as the Fifth Amendment may 
have been intended to operate.  Alternatively, we could place discre-
tion in the hands of courts or agencies, if one dares to think that there 
is less rent seeking in these domains. 
IV.  DISCLOSE OR DELIMIT 
The incrementalism problem has one potential solution that seeks 
to work within power politics without exacerbating rent seeking and 
without running into the dangers of overcompensation and under-
compensation.  The strategy is to force disclosure of information 
about regulatory goals.  At the outset of a campaign, advocates might 
be required to state their goal, or the import of their cost-benefit 
analysis, and then be barred from proceeding beyond this point for a 
specified period of time—perhaps five years.  For example, if a pro-
posal banned smoking in restaurants, advocates would be asked to 
declare where else they planned to propose bans.  If they said that 
they were working on a proposal for bars but thought that hotels 
should do as they like on a floor-by-floor, free-market basis, then ho-
tels in the jurisdiction would be guaranteed freedom from such regu-
lation for five years from the date of enactment of the first ban.  The 
idea is to avoid the incrementalism problem by fully informing the 
parties and encouraging them to form coalitions at the outset. 
There are obvious problems with this disclose-or-delimit rule.  The 
advocates may not be an easily identified group, and they may not be 
the same group that favors the next incremental step.  Indeed, two 
groups of advocates may have such different aims that one pushes for 
the first step in order to force a delimitation that interferes with the 
second group’s aims.  An optimistic response to this problem—and 
especially to the strategic behavior problem it raises—is that the dis-
closure process will simply force other groups to enter the fray at the 
first step, resulting in the best antidote to the problem of incremental-
ism.  Still, the identification problem is not a small one, and it recon-
nects with the problem of defining incrementalism itself.  The dis-
close-or-delimit rule has other weaknesses:  it forgoes useful learning 
from regulation, and it forces the law to stand still even in the face of 
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technological or other changes that might come about during the 
prescribed moratorium.  Compensation could offset some of these 
drawbacks, but it is difficult to introduce compensation without mak-
ing it discretionary and thus inviting rent seeking. 
By way of example, imagine that home mortgages are soon regu-
lated so that loans of more than 90% of the value of a property re-
quire debtor counseling or extra disclosure on the part of the origi-
nating bank.  With a disclose-or-delimit approach, advocates of this 
regulation (including a regulator like the Federal Reserve) must re-
veal whether they intend to push the rule to cover 80% mortgages, 
second mortgages, and home-equity loans.  Covering 80% mortgages 
presents less of a divide-and-conquer issue because the same banks are 
regulated in both steps, but a push to cover home-equity loans surely 
presents an incrementalism problem.  Lenders who expect to special-
ize in home-equity loans would be inclined to join in the defense 
against the first step’s 90% regulation if the regulator or other advo-
cate disclosed that inclusion of home-equity loans should be expected 
in a later step.  Note that the immediately affected banks might prefer 
that the regulation extend to home-equity lenders, especially once 
they are themselves regulated, but they are more inclined to be allied 
in the political process against all regulation if the coalition can repel 
the first step.  But what about later regulatory proposals regarding in-
terest rates, font size for disclosure materials, and the like?  A disclose-
or-delimit rule that included all regulations affecting the subject mat-
ter seems absurd because it would force omnibus bills or calculations 
of a size previously unknown.  Yet, a proposal regarding disclosure 
forms, maximum interest rates, or appraisal requirements might well 
be closer in political kind to the 90% rule than the others mentioned 
above.  It is simply difficult to define subjects in a way that allows us to 
say what is incremental and what is sufficiently unrelated.  The prob-
lem is akin to, but surely more serious than, that which accompanies a 
single-subject rule for legislation.62 
But a second example suggests the promise of the disclose-or-
delimit idea.  Imagine that the threat of serious climate change gene-
rates a proposal for a carbon tax.  Political opposition comes from var-
ious industries.  We might imagine that the first proposal sets a mod-
est carbon tax that exempts, directly or on a pass-through basis, the 
 
62 See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 803, 811-31 (2006) (describing the history of, justifications for, and inconsistent 
application of the single-subject rule found in many state constitutions and applicable 
to legislation). 
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carbon consumption of specified industries, such as steel and auto-
mobile manufacturing.  The incrementalism “problem,” or perhaps 
blessing, is that aluminum manufacturers and other interests might 
soon turn on the exempt industries.  A disclose-or-delimit rule pro-
vides a period during which policymakers cannot extend the tax to 
these other industries.  Similarly, if, instead of a carbon tax, legislation 
requires aluminum and other manufacturers to switch away from a 
high-carbon energy source, the switching requirement could not be 
extended in incremental fashion during the period of delimitation.  
In both cases, the rule encourages an upfront coalition and a political 
discussion.  The alternative of compensating the aluminum makers 
for their investments if the switching requirement is reversed may also 
be workable. 
To be sure, interest groups may simply not believe that the disclose-
or-delimit (or compensation) rule will be enforced.  A future legislature 
can override a previously enacted rule, and of course there will be rent-
seeking losses in the process of convincing this second legislature to do 
so or not to do so.  This is the familiar and difficult problem of govern-
mental precommitment, and its solutions draw on ideas about constitu-
tional constraints and political reputation.  Political reputation might 
do the job, but only if the public perceives that incrementalism has 
been well defined.  This might be so if advocates, or the legislation it-
self, can specify all the steps that could not be taken for five years.  A 
ban on assault weapons might say:  “No further ban, tax, or registration 
requirement shall be imposed for five years following the effective date 
of this statute on the firearms defined herein, and no ban, tax, registra-
tion requirement, or liability rule shall be imposed on any firearm not 
defined herein.”  A proposal to require a safety class or to require hunt-
ers to wear blaze orange might then pass because voters perceive that 
the ambiguity in the delimitation provision should be resolved in favor 
of safety legislation.  In contrast, a proposal to issue hunting licenses on-
ly to persons over the age of twenty-one might be understood as a fur-
ther, incremental ban, and, given the law passed earlier, political pres-
sure might make its presentation or passage very difficult.  In the 
carbon example, a legislature that violated the moratorium by extend-
ing the carbon tax to the automobile industry would probably face po-
litical repercussions, but one that did so as part of a package including 
bailout funds would not.  A government that required a particular envi-
ronmentally friendly technology would probably face serious opposition 
if it sought to renege on a commitment to compensate.  Gun control 
and a carbon tax are more difficult subjects of compensation, whether 
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promised upfront or in the event of a regulatory reversal.  In sum, it is 
difficult to generalize about the credibility of promises to delimit or to 
compensate.  There are settings, however, in which each promise seems 
reasonably credible. 
CONCLUSION 
Incremental regulation can divide interest groups and pit them 
against one another.  The process can be good or bad for the polity.  
Better laws might emerge from a process that is more transparent, less 
path dependent, and more likely to bring affected interests to the ta-
ble all at once.  If interested parties with full information would have 
defeated a proposal, then it is troubling—though sometimes fortu-
nate—that a step-by-step approach engineered, or stumbled upon, by 
advocates of the same proposal might succeed in implementing it.  
The problem is more than a mere voting paradox because the defeat 
of the all-or-nothing proposal is a stable result.  This incrementalism 
problem negates some of the enthusiasm otherwise attached to mod-
eration in legislation, agency regulation, and even judicial decision-
making.  At the same time, it is difficult to know when incrementalism is a 
problem.  Irreversibility surely plays some role, and the prospect of learn-
ing from regulation offers something of a counterweight, though less than 
usually imagined.  The problem is most likely to be present when the bur-
dened groups are competitors who might turn on one another and when 
the advocates are well organized or simply bear few costs. 
Even where we are certain that there is troubling incrementalism, 
it is a difficult problem to solve.  Compensation can undo past regula-
tion and bring interest groups together where they were once divided 
and conquered, but it introduces new misalignments in the world of 
power politics, and, when discretionary, it increases wasteful rent seek-
ing as well.  Compensation may double the problem rather than solve 
it.  Disclosure is another problem-solving tool, but it can do more 
harm than good where disparate groups favor incremental regulation. 
One modest conclusion is that the incrementalism problem offers 
a means of understanding why some slippery slopes seem more troub-
ling than others.  Another is that incrementalism has acquired far too 
good a name.  More drastic changes, especially if they do not impose 
large, upfront, irreversible costs, might well be superior to incremen-
tal ones.  I have emphasized relatively mundane examples, such as 
smoking bans and disability accommodations, because the mechanics 
of incrementalism are most readily observed in familiar, reasonably 
settled areas.  But we have yet to confront incrementalism as it per-
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tains to less settled matters, such as climate-change policy and health-
care reform.  These are fields in which some awareness of the prob-
lem of incrementalism is more likely to illuminate legal and policy 
choices than is the rhetoric of the slippery slope. 
It is difficult to solve a problem that is barely in the eye of the be-
holder.  One person’s incremental change is another’s dramatic 
upheaval.  Every law can be described as a step toward another.  Yet, 
there is reason to think that we can identify situations in which a pro-
posed change falls short of its advocates’ wishes and situations in 
which an interest opposed to and burdened by this first change would 
have reason, once it loses, to join the other side and encourage fur-
ther change.  In these situations, some skepticism about moderation is 
in order, and a disclose-or-delimit rule, or even a mandatory retroac-
tive-compensation rule, may hold promise. 
 
